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1. Hi Iain, and thanks for agreeing to do this interview.  Tell us, how did you get started in 
philosophy?  What made you become a philosopher? 
 
Two things got me started: art and material. Before I discovered that limitations of 
talent and technique made this improbable, I was attempting to be a performance 
artist, a sculptor and a musician and had therefore enrolled on a BA Fine Art at 
Reading University. During this time, I was working on a series of figures, in various 
media (copperplate, charcoal, silk-screen and acrylics), derived from headlamp-glare 
on the rain-soaked windscreen that absorbed my attention on a ten hour night-time 
bus journey from London to Edinburgh. The figure formed by light and rain on a 
moving screen reconstructed these physical elements as if constructing a four 
dimensional account of the dynamics of Kandinsky’s and Malevich’s most abstract 
compositions. This was the first move toward philosophy: abstraction and actuality 
are identical. The second had more to do with the material, and stemmed from 
working in metal. The physical hardness of metal is an alterable state, so that in 
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welding, it becomes liquid or can be drawn through with an electrical arc with less 
resistance than paper exerts on charcoal, was my Platonic moment, such that matter, 
the “darkest of all things”, revealed its capacity to become at the expense of its 
apparent solidity, its secure three-dimensional massiveness. Art taught me the fluidity 
of cave-bound appearance and that it could be pierced, that something lay on the 
other side of appearance that possessed a reality all the more striking for being 
impalpable, yet palpably achieved. At the same time, what were to me the 
exceedingly strange thoughts and forms communicated by the abstract languages 
developed in Joyce, Cage and Heidegger (whose Being and Time I had begun to 
appreciate, albeit less for its meaning than its extraordinary means), were becoming 
more immediate means to realize the aims my more or less ‘artistic’ investigations of 
matter had initiated. I began therefore to attend first year Philosophy classes, which 
began to introduce discipline into my thoughts, and that was it: the concept cut 
through more reality more quickly than the arc-welder through sheet-steel, and did 
so more impressively. If art had been for me the technique whereby the 
manipulability of reality was first demonstrated, philosophy now became a 
continuation of art by different means. I was fortunate while in Reading to be able to 
pursue my peculiar and unschooled fascination with Heidegger and, while following 
the traditional anglo-american curriculum of logic, semantics, and philosophy of 
science, to have enjoyed classes on Kant, Hegel and even Whitehead  
 
2. You are the author of Philosophies of Nature After Schelling (2006) and as a co-author, Idealism: 
The History of A Philosophy (2011).  A theme which seems to undergird both of these books is that 
contemporary philosophy has yet to grasp the full creative potential of the Idea as it is registered in 
philosophical idealism, and that there are possibilities in contemporary philosophy for idealism where 
Idealism can be understood in such a way that it need not necessarily exclude important dynamics 
found within naturalism, materialism, and realism.  I am wondering if you can speak specifically to 
the relationship between naturalism – or better yet, a “philosophy of nature” as you articulate it 
within your books – and the task of what you refer to as the “non-eliminative Idealism” proposed by 
Schelling, whom you closely follow but also modify.  Specifically, elements of such a philosophy also 
appear in Bergson, Whitehead, or Peirce, but it is Schelling’s nature philosophy that is most 
important for you (it is probably important to note here just how close philosophically Peirce and 
Schelling were to each other, especially with respect to their outlooks concerning philosophical 
cosmology and physics).  But it is Plato’s “physics of the Idea” that you knit with Schellingean nature 
philosophy instead, which in its own right yields some very unique insights and which has been an 
interest of yours for quite some time.  What are some of the more important and fruitful connections 
between Schellingean idealism, Platonic philosophy, and philosophical naturalism, as you see it?  
How might these connections prove useful for 21st-century speculative philosophy?  I am curious to 
know whether your research into Schelling and Plato at any point has crossed paths with Peirce’s own 
philosophy of nature, given the influences and connections involved?  
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Before discussing Peirce, philosophical cosmology and the philosophy of nature, I 
would like to outline some general conceptions concerning the Idea and the character 
of Idealist philosophy to which the earlier part of your question alludes. 
     As directly as possible, Idealism is that philosophy that affirms the reality of the 
Idea. The point is not that any account of reality must be from the standpoint of the 
Idea, of the Ideal, or that the conceptual is insuperable, as for example McDowell has 
it; but rather that reality is incompletely furnished unless the Idea is included in it. 
Idealism is therefore eliminative just when the Idea is accounted the species of which 
other entities – usually nature or matter, but also appearances – are genera. Nothing 
in this case is or can be on the far side of the concept. This is eliminative in that it 
doesn’t allow that the Idea be the Idea while nature be nature; rather the one must 
become an instance of the other, and the problem is exactly the same whether posed 
from the perspective of eliminative idealism or eliminative materialism. Idealism, 
when not eliminative, it seems to me – and I am particularly fond of pointing to some 
of its less read exemplars, such as Bosanquet or Pringle-Pattison – does not seek to 
account for one thing in terms of another, but for each thing exactly as it is. Such a view 
is evident in the fact that, for example, Plato’s auto kath’auto has less to do with Kant’s 
Ding an sich than with a simpler “itself by itself”: it is a causal account of subjectivity 
independent of consciousness, or the “it-attractor” by which whatever becomes becomes 
what it is. 
     To make the point as clear as possible, imagine an intrascientific contest regarding 
the actuality of the Idea. On the one hand, neuroscientists successfully eliminate talk 
of ideation from talk of brain structures, wherein nothing resembling “the Idea” is 
discovered. On the other, physics discovers that the Idea is an actuality. What is 
proven? That the Idea is not amongst the furniture of mentality but amongst that of 
actuality. This, it strikes me, is the Platonic tradition, and it is something that 
Schelling recovers – note the extended, critical discussion of the “substantiality” or 
“physical existence of the Idea” in the Timaeusschrift (70-73, 30-37), for example, or the 
following passage from the 1804 System of Philosophy as a Whole:  
Merely reflective humanity has no idea of an objective reason, of an Idea that as 
such is utterly real and objective; all reason is something subjective to them, as 
equally is everything ideal, and the idea itself has for them only the meaning of 
a subjectivity, so that they therefore know only two worlds, the one consisting of 
stone and rubble, the other of intuitions and the thinking thereupon. (SW VI: 
279) 
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In another direction entirely, if nature is considered the condition under which 
alone anything that can exist does so, then the nature that is includes precisely the 
Idea. Accordingly, to account for nature apart from the Idea simply misconstrues 
nature. But the risk of this misconstrual depends entirely on the species of our 
naturalism. If naturalism is based on what our best science tells us concerning nature, 
while this must be true if science is veridical (which if it were not would entail some 
very strange consequences), then the concept of nature formed on this basis depends 
entirely on which research programs are progressive in Lakatos’ sense, and thus on 
what projects are being pursued. Yet no individual science has nature itself as its 
subject, and nor, due to ongoing questions of reducibility (for example, of 
biochemistry to physics), do any combination of the sciences, regardless of the period 
of science we are discussing, past or future. Inevitably therefore, a concept of nature 
formed on the basis of the best science, will be a partial concept, or a concept of part 
of nature. This is why a philosophy of nature is required, for if it is true that nature is 
that condition under which alone anything that can exist does so, then all that exists 
requires contextualization within a concept of nature that, by definition, cannot be 
exclusive or eliminative. 
Further, nor can a philosophy of nature eliminate the false as such, since the 
generation of error is a function of at least the system of nature that produces 
ideation, so the capacity for error, the power of the false, must either be a part of 
nature or any ideation whatsoever is, merely by virtue of being such an event, true by 
definition. The only way a system of reason can be capable of falsity is if causal 
determination of the Idea is less important than its dependency: to be dependent 
upon nature for its production is not reducible to its being the effect of a cause, since 
if it is true that anything that can be is by nature alone, both the true and the false 
statement depend on “the nature that produces” (e tou poiountos physis, Plato, Philebus, 
28a) but do so differently regardless of the causal identity of the production of 
ideation (i.e. that the same neurological means are employed in the production of 
both). Of course, taking a fully Platonic line, we may say that the Idea is precisely not 
produced, but rather that it is that in virtue of which there is production at all. In this 
case, we must introduce an additional species of causality, and not one, I think, that 
can easily be reduced to a species of final causation; the Idea is rather the 
perturbations of the finite in the infinite, as the Philebus says, such that the “becoming 
of being [genesis eis ousian]” is the becoming that being undergoes precisely because 
becoming is dependent on an end it cannot, by definition, attain. From this we gain a 
philosophy of nature that is neither “pulled” by ends nor “pushed” by beginnings, but 
one in which the dependency of whatever is on whatever else is establishes the form 
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not only of particular existents, but also of becoming itself. The corollary of 
ontogenesis or the becoming of being must be the being of becoming, its form given 
that becoming is, or consequent upon creation having occurred in whatever manner 
is has, did, or will. 
What I find congenial in Peirce is that neither epistemically nor cosmologically 
does his concept of being yield to a species of finality whose character may be 
determined without approximation. And it seems to me that this is a characteristic 
that the majority of modern philosophers of nature share: the forms of becoming may 
be studied in domain-specific ways, for example, by morphogenesis in the life sciences; 
but the forms that qua becoming, becomings must assume if becoming is what they 
do, impose a particular discipline upon the thinking of process that, if the world is not 
eternal, as Proclus thought, is not only true of, but rather part of, the becoming they 
articulate. Again, then, the Idea is inseparable from the actuality. This is a world of 
irreducible operations on which mere items in it can only consequently be isolated by 
an operation that achieves this. These, then, are the operations characteristic of a 
philosophy of nature: genesis recapitulated in the genesis of isolation cannot be 
reversed, such that genesis itself is isolated, without an additional operation or 
continuation of genesis on which that isolation depends. And here, I think, we gain 
insight into the complex location of the Idea in nature: it is precisely the additional 
dimension articulated by the operation capable of abstracting its objects from the 
context on which they are dependent. And so too we gain an account of the isolation 
function on which the particularity of inquiries into nature as such depend. 
     I have not made any extended study of Peirce, but what seems to me important is 
that philosophers of nature such as Peirce and Whitehead be recovered not merely as 
historical instances but rather in the context of how their inquiries into nature present 
the conceptualization consequent upon it as modifications of precisely that process 
into which they are inquiring. I am particularly interested in the development of the 
dialectic of the physical whereby reflection upon it augments it in the dimension of 
the Idea without making the Idea into the finally determining instance of a nature 
directed towards it.  Nature thought as ontogenesis cannot but have as a consequence 
that the thought that nature is ontogenetic must be consequent upon an ontogenetic 
nature. If it does not have this consequence, it is not a thought of nature as 
ontogenetic. 
 
3. I want to stay with another historical question just for the moment, but this time refer to your newer 
co-authored book, Idealism: The History of a Philosophy in order to work out what philosophical 
idealism can offer.  It is intimated that among contemporary philosophers, the full impact of Hegelian 
philosophy is still not fully understood.  As Hegel’s own philosophy of nature is “ominous” (for lack 
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of a better way to put it), where does Hegel stand (if having any relevance for you) in your current 
work?  I ask because you had quite abit to say about Hegel in your talk which preceded Slavoj Zizek’s 
talk, from this past summer of 2012.  What should philosophers these days be doing with Hegel?   
 
To ignore Hegel proves, I would agree with Foucault, to be impossible. Hence his 
recovery in contemporary philosophy, however attenuated such a recovery might 
seem on occasion to be by the mere sociality of reason rather than, as I might say, its 
naturalization. I will try to explain what I mean. The Hegelian problem that most 
interests me is how it is that form him, the Science of Logic completes the Philosophy of 
Nature. The latter is compromised in that its purpose is to demonstrate what we might 
call the consequent character of naturalistic realism, which is the function of his 
characterization of nature as the “self-estranged idea”. It is the philosophy of nature 
that mediates logic and mind, the “grasp of things in thought” (Encyclopaedia Logic §24), 
insofar as to think nature entails that thing and thought be thought as mutually 
repulsive, and their common locus in logic shattered and suppressed, in the inevitably 
vain attempt to think the thing as without its thought. This is a problem not just for 
Hegel, but for all concept-antecedent engagements with the historicity of existence, 
for which the problem of nature may be taken here as shorthand. That is to say, 
while the rediscovery of the concept from which it turns out its object has been 
articulated makes the concept insuperable, the concept is a member of the historicity 
of existence as much as its object. The latter is indeed, in this case, consequent upon 
the concept, but the concept’s priority in this regard is only consequently a 
conceptual, but antecedently a natural-historical achievement. This is why the locus 
of an engagement with Hegel’s Naturphilosophie should not be the phenomenon of life, 
as Beiser (2008) for example argues, but rather geology, with which he briefly deals in 
the Philosophy of Nature in order to dismiss mere chronology as “of no interest to 
philosophy” (§24??); not the orbits of the planets, but cosmogony. Granting, with 
Hegel, that antecedence is not a problem of chronology, neither is it reducibly a 
matter of conceptual interiority, which was one of Schelling’s major criticisms of 
Hegel’s logic, that in it, “the concept was everything and left nothing outside itself” 
(History of Modern Philosophy, tr. Bowie, 134). Accordingly, the historicity of the concept, 
for Hegel, is a matter internal to the concept, from which the historicity of things 
thought becomes in consequence indissociable. Yet Hegel’s demand for philosophy is 
that its beginning be not merely the beginning of philosophy, but of everything (Science of 
Logic, tr. Millar, 67). In this contrast lies everything interesting, and Schelling’s 
advantage. When, at the start of the Stuttgart Seminars, he poses the interrelated 
problems of system and philosophical beginnings, he enmeshes the beginning of 
philosophy in the problem of a beginning that is not its own: “To what extent is a 
system ever possible? I would answer that long before man decided to create a 
system, there already existed one, that of the world-system or cosmos” (tr. Pfau, 197). 
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In other words, it is not thing but creation that the concept, insofar as it fails to 
embrace it in thought if it is thought as creation, nevertheless recapitulates creation 
insofar as it is thought. 
Yet what Hegel presents is therefore a morphogenesis of the concept, as Bosanquet 
intimated in the subtitle of his own Logic (1911). Hegel does indeed discover rather 
than simply invent the movements of the concept, its functionality and its kinematics, 
its physics, a dimension that tends to be at once emphasized as the nature, ethos or 
character of the concept, and subjugated by the co-articulation of thought and thing 
that is the task, says Hegel, of logic insofar as it is to make a science of metaphysics. 
Taking this view of Hegel, and investigating the development of the functions and 
motions attaching to the concept, yields interesting results, insofar as the near 
Malevich-like “theory of the additional element” by which, in the Differenzschrift, on 
which I have been teaching a Masters course for some years now, Hegel begins to 
delineate his new science, would be simply a mechanical addition were it not for his 
discovery of the immanence of his additions to, for instance, the Kantian account of 
the antinomy. His procedure there already consists in discovering the movement 
halted by the understanding that remains therefore frustrated in reason, and thus 
freeing the motions of reason such that they complete the movement by retaining and 
augmenting their logical coordinates, so to speak, in the antinomy. Thus the 
additional element turns out to be the element in which the concept moves. 
Logical functionalism has, of course, a post-Hegelian philosophical history in 
Frege and, as Ray Brassier has been excitingly showing, in Sellars’ metaphysics. But it 
is the coordination of this with the problem Schelling embraces but Hegel elides, of 
creation, that yields one of the chief untapped experiments of German Idealist 
philosophy in general, and it is precisely ignored by any philosophical re-
appropriation of Hegelianism as jettisoning the problem of nature or as emphasizing 
only the intersubjective constitution of reason. The naturalization of logic is not 
simply a converse of Hegel’s logicisation of nature, but opens the concept, its 
insuperability notwithstanding, to the thought that its creation is not itself in thought. 
In consequence, the concept is constitutively mute with regard to that upon which it 
is consequent, which is ontology’s recompense for Kant’s demonstration that being 
cannot issue from reasoning. For me, these aspects of Hegel refocus attention on a 
problem that Platonic physics first articulated: why, if becoming is ceaseless, does it 
not have an eidos but rather power – why, that is, are power and intelligible causation 
non-identical? In Philosophies of Nature after Schelling, I argued, I now think wrongly, that 
the powers of the Sophist’s ontology are coincident with the causality of the Idea 
outlined in the Phaedo. On the contrary, while the Idea is the grasping of the rational 
ground of intellection in acts of intelligence, so too production is productive even in 
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intellection. Hence the asymmetry of the intelligible and the generative applies both 
to the intelligible and to the generative, and the two are indissociable. 
 
4. Recently some interesting overlaps between your work and Ray Brassier’s have become apparent 
(for example, some of the ideas that have come up in each of your Berlin talks).  In particular, while 
Brassier rejects vitalism and panpsychism outright, and while your work has come to stringently 
critique “traditional” vitalism and instead opt for a pluralist “neo-vitalism” of sorts (for example in 
the Q &A session of your Berlin talk you mention that you are not convinced that all of panpsychism 
is strictly false), you also seem to have some nuanced thoughts about panpsychism – a perspective 
which is often related to traditional forms of vitalism.  Despite your critique you choose to focus on 
processes of vital compulsion fueled by a transcendental ground that either in full or in part operates by 
a non-conceptual form of negativity, an eternal “No,” where this negativity is also curiously inscribed 
within the dynamics of the rational as much as it is inscribed within the irrational (a very good 
commentary on this idea, I think, is Krell’s The Tragic Absolute and more recently, McGrath’s Dark 
Ground of Spirit).  In fact, on several occasions Brassier has suggested that we return to Hegel in 
order to revisit, and then modify, some of these dimensions, especially regarding a sort of non-cognitive 
“efficacy of primary transcendental synthesis,” a “self-synthesizing potency” responsible for “intensive 
materiality.”  
    For both you and Brassier, then, this negativity is indeed vital in its potency, a “vital negativity” 
therefore.  I thought that this was an interesting point of cross-over between two very differently 
appearing philosophies, and it is in particular how I am able to dialogue with Brassier’s form of 
naturalism given my own interest in contemporary “neo-vitalism” (with its corresponding dynamics of 
the divine Potenzen).  It seems that this all begs the question of understanding the generic scope of 
systematic and speculative metaphysics: how this vital negativity is involved with your concept of 
“ground” generally as the non-preceding yet generative condition for what is in the particular, a cosmic 
animating source or power that is both “creative” as much as it is destructive, but which is also 
“upheld” by the physics of the particular bodies it helps to animate by sharing in a mutual form of 
force of creation/creativity (thus “powers”). 
     Now, you have mentioned that an upcoming book of yours may be titled Grounds and Powers, and 
that you are working on considering grounds understood as powers in the plural.  Given this interesting 
take on negativity or ground by both you and Brassier – if I am grasping this correctly – and given 
that you have stated “Being unconditioned, no experience thereof is possible” (experience of this 
unconditioned ground is impossible), you have also stated that, “the pursuit of grounds, the descendent 
dimension, is a vital element of philosophy.”  The result of this descent is a split between thinking the 
unconditioned (the Absolute) as a “production monism” or experiencing it as a “production 
pluralism.” 
     My question is this: I am wondering with the most generic naturephilosophy in mind, despite the 
localization of generative powers in the plural, could we not say that the more crucial and 
systematically useful (or speculatively daring) question might be to consider the generic quality of the 
vital negative, as such?  Why a many for you here rather than the one?  You have meditated on this 
particular problematic within transcendental philosophy in your article, “The Movements of the 
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World: The Sources of Transcendental Philosophy,” and I’d like to press you on the idea of how you 
defend your neo-vital pluralism.  That rather than considering the conditions around the orbits of 
things, how would you respond to the claim that we may wish to consider descendence into generative 
conditions as such (if we are to attain the most encompassing explanation), from processes and powers 
to process and power as general category (this may be a question of orientation from the particular to 
the general or vice versa, still, the very nature of speculative philosophy and its definition remains up 
for grabs – a science of the particular or an account of the whole, or some synthesis of the two).   
     Some philosophers have tried the conjectural and systematic route while balancing the created 
particulars with the source of their creation, aiming for comprehensiveness (Whitehead with his theory 
of creativity as a radical form of ground, but also Hartshorne and other process philosophers among 
whose ranks I would actually add the French philosopher Quentin Meillassoux, whose Surchaos 
could be understood as a fundamentally productive ground in a “process” sense).  It was Meillassoux 
who said, "What is strange in my philosophy is that it's an ontology that never speaks about *what 
is* but only about what *can be*. Never about what there is because this I have no right to speak 
about."  It seems that the conditions of generativity may possess a distinct integrity, “ultimacy” for 
some, that while no more “real” than what is produced, certainly deserves to be called out as an 
essential (perhaps even necessary) condition of creation and creativity, of contingency, and the like.  
What are your thoughts here concerning the varieties of transcendental philosophy in question, 
especially respect to the concepts of ground, of creativity, and of their ultimacy? 
 
Panpsychism is tempting from the point of view of an augmented naturalism. If, that 
is, thought is a worldly item, consistent naturalism must explain it as thought, with 
neurophysiology as its insufficient but necessary ground, if thought is additionally 
efficacious than its own actualization pathways. Because the alternative is that 
mindedness remains alien rather than worldly, panpsychism rejects emergence as 
proposing that mindedness must arise from what is without it. But temptation aside, 
the cost is too high: if once true, panpsychism is always true, such that mind is 
without beginning or end. As with the advent of life, with that of mind, the universe is 
irreversibly altered in its image. Not only must this again prove autochthonous, it 
must also propose a homogeneity-of-nature account insofar as it seeks to deny that, as 
Thomas Nagel puts it in Mind and Cosmos, the “mind-body problem is a local 
problem”. Yet it is precisely not a local problem insofar as emergence, if true, entails 
that every advent is such consequently upon an antecedent with which it is neither 
identical nor to which it can be reduced. Thus, I can accept the panpsychist thesis 
that mindedness is no special case only on emergentist grounds: it is because 
emergence is the emergence of aliens that mindedness is not a special case.  
    It is because I reject the mono-causal vision of the vitalist and the homogeneity-of-
nature to which panpsychism by default adheres that I am a pluralist concerning the 
number and nature of efficacies or powers. I see no good reason to assume that we 
might restrict the plausible number of causes in nature to four, two or one, not least 
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because the laws of the early universe might not resemble those of the later. And if 
this were so, in what would their ‘transition set’, so to speak, causally consist? 
Precisely because they are later, I would add they cannot so resemble save in one 
crucial respect: every emergent is such just when it is dependent upon what it is not. 
And the same must apply to ground: if ground is antecedent in respect of its 
consequent, it is transcendentally a second-order consequent but descendentally, so to 
speak, a first-order issuant of that from which ground itself issues. Here there lies a 
philosophical decision: opt for essential reciprocity between ground and consequent, 
and metabolize the principle of sufficient reason; or eschew the ultimacy of grounds. 
Here there is a parallel with the dispositionalists in contemporary philosophy: either 
powers are capacities of entities, which are thus primitive with respect to powers, or 
entities must be consequent upon ungrounded powers. On this, Mumford’s highly 
Schellingian “ungrounded argument” is persuasive. It is for this reason that I would 
draw attention to the two species of negation to which you have in turn drawn my 
attention via Ray’s engagement with Hegel. Determinate negation (X not being not-
X) is not identical to the negation of determinacy as such.  
When therefore you quote me as saying that “the pursuit of grounds, the 
descendent dimension, is a vital element of philosophy”, I do not confuse the pursuit 
with the possession of grounds. That this element is “vital” does not mean that it is an 
instance of life, but that descendence is required because no ground is ultimate. 
There is a dynamic tension between grounds and unground, just as between 
antecedent and consequent, and the conceiving of this never seals the process. The 
negativity of what there is not, therefore, is precisely the unconditioning of grounds 
consequent upon the efficacy of consequents and the unconditioned efficacy by which 
creation occurs, if it does. 
Regarding transcendental philosophy, what I was doing in the ‘Movements of the 
world’ essay was, in a word, to dispel the myth of the “single and sudden revolution” 
in the interests of the transcendental project. We can describe this as Kant does: the 
knowing that, in cognition, the objects of that cognition derive from the production of 
concepts, not from the causal paths of objects through the eye into the brain, as 
Aristotle had it. Kant’s peculiar invention consists therefore not only in the negative 
demonstration that there are no paths from things to thoughts (the Copernican 
revolution), nor from thoughts to things (the elimination of existence proofs), but also 
in the positive demonstration that in knowing, the concept is recursive on concepts. 
There are, literally, powers of the concept in the mathematical sense, by means of 
which from conceiving anything whatever can be ‘deduced’ a second-order knowing 
of the conceiving at issue. Such knowing is therefore above the ‘transcendental 
substrate’ (the totality of possible predicates) in precisely the sense that only some are 
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actualized in the knowing. It is this operativity that gives thought back its place 
amongst nature. Hence the pursuit of grounds, the ‘descendental’ dimension issues 
precisely from the doubling of the concept. Kant’s having noted that ‘dependency’ 
trumps ‘empirical origin’ (CPR A56/B80) provides a start; but because empirical 
origin is not the same thing as creation that the doubled concept has an indissociable 
externality, an ‘extainment set’, as it were, that cannot be “resolved into reason but 
remains ever in the depths”, as Schelling perfectly expresses it. Naturephilosophy thus 
entails both the extainment sets of the powers of the concept and confronts the 
ungrounding of nature in creation. 
Thus it is creation rather than creativity with which I think speculative 
philosophy must be concerned if it is to sacrifice neither the powers of the concept 
nor the nature of which they form part. Creativity consists in the efficacy of 
additional powers, creation in the emergence of power where there was none. This is 
why the concept ‘thing’ is, as again Schelling says, simply “the abstract concept of 
worldly essences” (VII, 349), and also why a powers ontology must entail their 
ungrounding. The only systematicity there can be is consequent upon Urchaos, as the 
solar system shows.  
 
5.  Iain, thanks so much for taking the time to answer these questions.  If you have any closing 
thoughts or would like to inform readers of upcoming projects, talks, or appearances, please feel free to 
use this space as you see fit.  Please also feel free to tell us more about your forthcoming book, I am 
sure many are excited to hear any details that you can offer about.  Thanks so much again.   
 
Thanks for your interest, and your complex and fascinating questions. They have 
made me think. 
It is the above project that forms the core of my repeatedly touted but yet to be 
completed Grounds and Powers. I will be treating of some of it, with Jason Wirth, at the 
Duquesne summer school on Naturphilosophie, which I am very much looking forward 
to. I also have some translations I want to publish, and some papers still in the 
pipeline, all of which contribute to this project. In part these will serve to make good 
my claim that Schelling’s is a Naturphilosophie throughout, and in part I want to tackle 
naturephilosophy in the context of contemporary ontology, particularly of the field 
ontology that Markus Gabriel has been doing such excellent work on, and the powers 
ontology that has become inescapable in contemporary metaphysics. If only they 
read Schelling. Naturephilosophy remains my concern not because I think nature is 
some vast thing that demands its ontological rights be recognized, but because it 
cannot be that what is is reducibly conceptual. Nature induces the descendental 
dimension into the powers of the concept, which is why thinking nature, or ontology, 
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is always kata dunamin, as Plato constantly concludes, between the Idea and what is 
not it.  
 
Department of Philosophy  
Immaculata University – Philadelphia 
 Pennsylvania USA 
lniemocz@mail.immaculata.edu 
 
